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SPACESAVER SYS., INC. V. ADAM: AN EMPLOYMENT 
AGREEMENT CONTAINING A FOR-CAUSE PROVISION 
AND AN INDEFINITE TERM OF EMPLOYMENT IS A 
“CONTINUOUS FOR-CAUSE” CONTRACT, NOT AN AT-
WILL EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT. 
 
By: Patrick F. Toohey 
 
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the presumption of at-
will employment is negated where an employment agreement contains 
an explicit termination for-cause provision, despite an indefinite term of 
employment.  Spacesaver Sys., Inc. v. Adam, 440 Md. 1, 26-27, 98 A.3d 
264, 280 (2014).  The court further held that the plain for-cause 
language of the employment agreement, to which the parties mutually 
assented, created “continuous for-cause” employment, rather than at-
will employment or a lifetime employment.  Id.  
     Spacesaver Systems, Inc. (“SSI”) was owned and operated by 
siblings: Carla Adam (“Adam”), Amy Hamilton (“Hamilton”), and 
David Craig (“Craig”).  In 2006, Adam and Hamilton suspected that 
Craig was stealing from SSI.  As a result, SSI’s attorney drafted a new 
employment agreement for each sibling, which included a provision 
titled “Termination by the Company For Cause” (“for-cause 
provision”).  By the terms of Adam’s employment agreement (the 
“Agreement”), SSI could “at any time and without notice, terminate 
[Adam] ‘for cause.’”  The Agreement referenced a “term of this 
Employment Agreement,” but failed to actually define the term of 
employment.  SSI’s attorney drafted a separate Stock Purchase 
Agreement, which compelled a terminated employee to sell their stock 
to the remaining shareholders. 
     Following execution of the individual employment agreements, 
Craig resigned and sold his stock to Adam and Hamilton, leaving each 
with fifty percent interest in the company.  Subsequently, Hamilton 
became dissatisfied with Adam’s sales performance.  Hamilton sent 
Adam a letter expressing her intent to acquire Adam’s SSI stock 
pursuant to the Stock Purchase Agreement, concluding that Adam’s 
employment would be terminated.  Shortly after, Adam received a 
second letter from SSI officially terminating her employment.   
     Adam filed a complaint against Hamilton and SSI in the Circuit 
Court for Montgomery County, alleging that she was terminated 
without cause in violation of the Agreement. The circuit court found in 
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favor of Adam, concluding that the Agreement transformed a previously 
at-will employment relationship into a lifetime contract because the 
Agreement’s for-cause provision would be rendered superfluous.  SSI 
appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, which partially 
affirmed and partially reversed the circuit court’s decision, holding that 
the Agreement created neither an at-will employment nor a lifetime 
contract, but a “continuous contract terminable for-cause.”  SSI filed a 
petition for writ of certiorari in the Court of Appeals of Maryland, which 
the court granted. 
     The court first laid the groundwork for its analysis, noting the 
interpretation of a contract is subject to de novo review.  Spacesaver, 
440 Md. at 7-8, 98 A.3d 268 (citing Towson Univ. v. Conte, 384 Md. 
68, 78, 862 A.2d 941, 946 (2004)).  Maryland courts consider the 
language of contracts objectively to determine “what a reasonable 
person in the position of the parties would have meant at the time [the 
contract] was effectuated.”  Spacesaver, 440 Md. at 8, 98 A.3d at 268-
69 (quoting Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Daniels, 303 Md. 254, 
261, 492 A.2d 1306, 1310 (1985)).  Where the terms of an agreement 
are unambiguous, the court will not consider what the parties thought 
the agreement meant or what they intended it to mean.  Spacesaver, 440 
Md. at 8, 98 A.3d at 268-69 (quoting Daniels, 303 Md. at 261, 492 A.2d 
at 1310).  Instead, courts contemplate “the character of the contract, its 
purpose, and [surrounding] circumstances” to interpret a contract’s 
meaning.  Spacesaver, 440 Md. at 8, 98 A.3d at 269 (quoting Calormis 
v. Woods, 353 Md. 425, 436, 727 A.2d 358, 363 (1999)).  
     The court of appeals began its analysis by examining the common 
law presumption of at-will employment, or employment that may be 
terminated at the will of either party at any time.  Spacesaver, 440 Md. 
at 13, 98 A.3d at 271.  The court concluded that the presumption acts as 
an aid in contract interpretation, rather than a limit on freedom of 
contract; there is nothing in the common law doctrine that prohibits an 
understanding between the parties from rebutting the presumption of at-
will employment.  Id. at 13, 98 A.3d at 271-72 (citing McCullough Iron 
Co. v. Carpenter, 67 Md. 555, 557, 11 A. 176, 178 (1887)).  The court 
then recognized two categories of employment contracts that would 
rebut this presumption: those with definite duration and those with clear 
termination for-cause provisions.  Spacesaver, 440 Md. at 15, 98 A.3d 
at 273.  Failure to show that the Agreement falls into either of these 
categories would render Adam’s cause of action meritless.  Id.  
     To categorize Adam’s employment, the court contemplated the 
nature of the Agreement.  Spacesaver, 440 Md. at 15, 98 A.3d at 273.  
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In doing so, the court placed emphasis on the clear for-cause language 
in the Agreement’s termination provision.  Id. at 16, 98 A.3d at 273.  
The court indicated that although the Agreement had an indefinite 
employment term, either a definite employment term or a for-cause 
provision would independently rebut the at-will presumption.  Id. 
(citing Conte, 384 Md. at 80, 862 A.2d at 948).  Although this 
conclusion was dicta in Conte, the court noted that several other 
jurisdictions have adopted a similar rule.  Spacesaver, 440 Md. at 16, 
98 A.3d at 273-74 (citing Bell v. Ivory, 966 F. Supp. 23 (D.D.C. 1997); 
Gladden v. Ark. Children’s Hosp., 292 Ark. 130, 136 (Ark. 1987)).  
Thus, the Agreement’s clear for-cause termination provision removed 
the at-will employment presumption.  Spacesaver, 440 Md. at 17, 98 
A.3d at 274.  
     After concluding that the Agreement did not create an at-will 
employment relationship, the court addressed the indefinite nature of 
the Agreement to draw a distinction between lifetime contracts and 
continuous for-cause contracts.  Spacesaver, 440 Md. at 18, 98 A.3d 
275.  Continuous for-cause contracts remain in effect until the employee 
is terminated for cause or incompetence, whereas a lifetime contract is 
often an informal, oral guarantee of permanent employment.  Id. at 20, 
98 A.3d at 276.  Further, the court expressed the general reluctance to 
enforce lifetime contracts based on lack of definiteness and formality.  
Id. at 23, 98 A.3d at 278.   However, the court recognized the slight 
overlap between the two types of contracts, noting that even a “so-called 
lifetime contract only continues to operate as long as the employer 
remains in business and the employee remains capable of working.”  Id. 
at 21-22, 98 A.3d at 276-277 (quoting Chesapeake & Potomac 
Telephone Co. of Baltimore City v. Murray, 198 Md. 526, 533, 84 A.2d 
870, 873 (1951)).   
     The court articulated that employment contracts containing for-cause 
provisions are definite, even though they lack a “typical durational 
term.”  Spacesaver, 440 Md. at 20, 98 A.3d at 275 (quoting Spacesaver, 
212 Md. App. at 442, 69 A.3d at 506)).  The court reasoned that the 
Agreement’s “operative terms are expressed [in writing], or in the case 
of the employment’s durational term, omitted – definitively,” which 
eliminated the uncertainty of future termination.  Spacesaver, 440 Md. 
at 24, 98 A.3d at 278.  Therefore, because the termination for-cause 
provision of the Agreement was clear and each of the parties assented, 
the court held that the Agreement was a formal employment contract 
best characterized as “continuous for-cause.”  Id. at 27, 98 A.3d at 280.  
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     Finally, the court cautioned that its holding was not a departure from 
the common law presumption of at-will employment.  Spacesaver, 440 
Md. at 25, 98 A.3d at 279.  Rather, the presumption is defeated only 
“when the parties explicitly negotiate and provide for a definite term of 
employment or a clear for-cause provision.”  Id.  In this case, SSI’s 
attorney could have kept Adam’s employment at-will by omitting the 
for-cause provision or by including an express at-will provision.  Id.  
Instead, Adam’s attorney included the explicit for-cause provision in 
the Agreement. Id. 
     In Spacesaver, the Court of Appeals of Maryland drew a distinction 
between at-will employment and continuous for-cause employment.  In 
doing so, the court encourages the drafters of employment contracts, 
who intend the particular contract to be at-will, to specifically include 
an at-will provision in the language of the contract.  Practitioners should 
be aware that where an employment contract fails to specify a definite 
term and fails to include a clear for-cause provision, Maryland courts 
will construe the contract as at-will.  This decision illustrates 
Maryland’s longstanding common law approach to contract formation 
and interpretation, affirming that clear and concise language will often 
prevail. 
